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80 SEP. 1940

With the Illustrations of the

THE KAFFIR WAR:

A Letter

ADDRESSED TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EARL GREY,

Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies.

CONTAINING

REMARKS ON THE CAUSES OF THE PRESENT WAR,
AND THE PAYMENT OF ITS EXPENCES;
THE MEANS OF PREVENTION,

&c. &c. &c.

BY J. J. FREEMAN,

RECENTLY RETURNED TO ENGLAND FROM KAFFIRLAND AND THE
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

LONDON:

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“In our relations with those Tribes (the Aborigines of Southern Africa) it yet remains to try the efficacy of a systematic and persevering adherence to justice, conciliation, forbearance, and the honest arts by which civilization may be advanced and Christianity diffused among them; and such a system must be immediately established and rigidly enforced.”

LORD GLENELG'S Despatch to }
GOVERNOR SIR B. D'URBAN. } 26th Dec., 1835.

THE KAFFIR WAR.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EARL GREY,

Secretary of State, &c. &c. &c.

MY LORD,—

It appears to me that there are four principal questions which forcibly press themselves on the attention of Englishmen, in relation to this new Kaffir war.

1. What are its causes ?
2. Who are to defray the heavy charges it involves ?
3. How to account for the alleged disaffection of some of the native tribes, who have usually been so prompt in defending the colony ?
4. How are we to prevent the recurrence of such calamities ?

I may not be able to answer all these inquiries to the satisfaction of all parties ; possibly, not of any. But in so grave a case it becomes the duty of every man who thinks he can throw any light on the subject, to add his quota of information, and to offer his best suggestions. Having lately visited the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and passed over the whole of the present

scenes of this Kaffir outbreak, and paid some attention to passing occurrences, I consider myself in a position to submit a few remarks to your Lordship for perusal.

I.—THE CAUSES OF THIS WAR.

The *immediate* cause seems to have been the measures adopted by Sir Harry Smith, "Governor of the colony, and High Commissioner for the affairs of the border tribes," of deposing Sandilla, the Chief of the Gaika tribes, and his subsequent attempt to make him a prisoner.

The reason of Sir Harry Smith's adoption of these steps appears to have been the refusal of Sandilla and Anta to meet him at King William's Town, where he had appointed all the Gaika chiefs to attend. Sandilla had received a hint that the Governor intended to seize him and make "an example" of him, and some parties had more than whispered that "he ought to be hanged." Very naturally and very prudently, he abstained from coming to the meeting of the chiefs. But what had occasioned the uneasiness that induced Sir Harry to summon the chiefs together at that time, and to proceed himself from Cape Town to the frontier? Suspensions, it is said, were afloat of some evil designs on the part of the Kaffirs. They are accused of preparing for war, and that, under the instigation of Sandilla. *This most essential point remains to be proved.* No doubt the Kaffirs were discontented enough, and Sir Harry Smith had been labouring under a strange and fatal delusion in supposing either that he had conciliated them, or by the prestige of his name, subdued and frightened them. No doubt there were secret preparations for war going forward—future war at some time or other—but the question is, What created the present state of

uneasiness on the frontier, that induced Sir Harry Smith to summon the chiefs? The immediate cause of this appears to have been of so supremely ridiculous a character, as scarcely to deserve a second thought, or merit record, even in the pages of a mere ephemeral pamphlet. And yet as crises and events of great magnitude often originate in comparatively trifling things, it may be, that this sanguinary war has originated in the paltry circumstances I now proceed to describe.

A considerable number of Kaffir servants, who had been employed by some of the frontier farmers in the colony, left that service, and returned to their country. An impostor had appeared among the Kaffirs, Umlanjeni. He assumed to be a prophet; he represented himself as having been dead about seven years, but raised to life again—that he had been sent back to life by their old chief Gaika, and others, to regulate the disordered affairs of their nation—that he had power to perform many wonderful things—that the English would now melt away, or be driven into the ocean, and the Kaffirs regain their old territorial possessions. The news of this wonderful man spread far and wide; the Kaffir servants in the colony were all anxious to see him—to see him with their own eyes. They accordingly forsook the farmers and returned to Kaffirland. Excitement followed;—it was now *suspected* that the Kaffirs were preparing for war. This was converted into a report that they actually were so;—some believed it, some affected to believe it, and the Kaffirs were told in their turn that the English were coming to make war on them. Of course they too were on the alert—and so both parties were on the alert; and ere long it was thought that the Governor's presence was required on the frontier, and he proceeded thither, and the chiefs were directed to assemble to meet him. Sandilla declined attending. He had been warned, and had more than his suspi-

cions, that the feelings of the Governor were unfriendly towards him, and he was unwilling to trust himself in his hands. He knew of course the history of Hintza, and he knew also how Makomo had been contemptuously treated, on whose neck Sir Harry Smith had trampled; and Sandilla was naturally unwilling to place himself within reach of danger, so long as he could avoid it. Then the next step was to depose him, and of course the next to offer a reward for his apprehension, and to catch him and make an example of him. This measure offended the Kaffirs. Some of them sagaciously and sarcastically remarked that "The man would become very rich who apprehended Sandilla." Colonel Mackinnon and 600 troops are then sent out on that service; the Kaffirs watch them, and seize their opportunity at a favourable moment, attack the party, and drive back the colonel and his forces, *re infecta*, and with the loss of many killed and wounded. Most of the Kaffir police, well-mounted, with their arms, ammunition, skill, experience, and enmity, then go over to the side of their countrymen and join their ranks against the colony.

These are the historical circumstances which have developed the present outbreak, but the real cause of the war lies much deeper.—*The hatred of English aggression on Kaffir territory* is the deep-rooted cause of all these calamities. Without that, the vaticinations of the prophet Umlanjeni would have had little effect; but in it they found a ready material to work upon, and sympathies to respond to his call. The Kaffirs, it must be remembered, are not a few nomadic savages, wandering over the surface of a large country, and caring little whether they occupy one section of it or another. They are a numerous people, settled down in their respective localities, which they occupy from generation to generation; they dwell in their ancient kraals or villages, cultivate large portions of land for native corn and

vegetables, and rear extensive herds of cattle. With these home scenes they are familiar from their infancy, and amidst these they are buried in a good old age, honoured and beloved by their families and friends, just as in a more civilized state of society. And moreover, this country of the Kaffirs possesses all those charms of exquisite landscape scenery which invest them with imperishable interest in the mind of the native. The Amatola Mountains and surrounding country, to which public attention is just now directed, and from which range Sir Harry Smith has published his government notice, that "he will expel for ever these treacherous savages," whom "he will destroy and exterminate,"—these Amatola Mountains constitute some of the most bold, beautiful, and picturesque scenery in South Africa—their lofty heights, wood-crowned summits, ravines and streams, their verdure, varied tints and boundless luxuriance, no traveller can see without a thrill of enjoyment, where the sublime and magnificent are blended in inimitable perfection with the beautiful and the lovely. The Kaffirs may have no artists to paint these scenes, no poet Pringle of their own to describe, no "Burke on the Sublime and Beautiful" to descant on them ;— but they have strong instinct to love them,—a keen sense of right to grasp them tenaciously, as an inheritance descended from their fathers ; and to dispossess them of that inheritance is to make them restless, embittered, hostile, resolute to death, till they either regain them or perish in the attempt. It were just as easy for a foreign power to land on the shores of old Scotland, and dispossess her native clans of their loved and glorious scenes, as for British settlers to expel the Amakosa from their homes, without a fearful struggle, such as ever characterises the seizure of the lands of a brave, proud, determined people, and that saturates their soil with their blood.

The policy of the Cape government has been practically to add to its territory, and this under the plea, and often the appearance, of necessity. About sixty or seventy years ago, the Gamtoos River was the eastern boundary of the colony. Soon after that, say in 1780, the Great Fish River, seventy miles further to the east, was declared its boundary, and this was again published by Lord Macartney, in 1798. It was not till 1812 that the Kaffirs were actually driven over the Great Fish River, when about 10,000 square miles of territory were added to the colony. In effecting this, not less than 20,000 Kaffirs and Gonaquas were driven away, and their huts and villages committed to the flames. In this work of destruction, the troops were employed many weeks, and Kaffirs who lingered about the country were shot. In 1817, Lord Charles Somerset entered into some arrangements with Gaika, with the view of making him "*Chief of his nation.*" Jealousies arose between Gaika and the other chiefs; a confederacy was formed, a battle was fought, and Gaika was routed. The Governor of the colony came to his help. Colonel Brereton invaded Kaffirland, and obtained above 20,000 head of cattle, and slaughtered many of the people. The Kaffirs resented it, and in 1819 attacked Graham's Town, at that time a mere military post. They were repulsed with great loss, and retired over the Fish River. The colonial government prepared to follow them, and chastise them. Troops pursued them to the Kei, burning villages, plundering 30,000 head of cattle, and shooting all who could not escape. In 1823, the Kaffirs renewed some predatory incursions, and at the close of that year were in turn attacked by Major Somerset. Makomo's village was taken by surprise, many natives slaughtered, and 7000 head of cattle captured. The Kaffirs were now excluded from another section of their country, amounting to about a million and a half of

acres, and which was called somewhat ambiguously, "NEUTRAL TERRITORY," afterwards more conveniently designated THE CEDED TERRITORY—a portion of which was afterwards called the "Kat River Settlement," and given to Hottentots, as lands were given to settlers in Albany. Much irritation and annoyance continued to exist between the colonists and the Kaffirs; and in 1830, a military commando entered Kaffirland, accompanied by a party of boers, and it was on that occasion that Seko, a relation of the house of Gaika, and a high chief, was shot, with some of his people, by the boers. Exasperation was created. Expostulations followed, but in vain. Towards the close of 1833, Makomo, Botman, Tyali, and others, were finally expelled from the so-called Neutral Territory, where they had been permitted for some years to reside and graze their cattle.

The expulsion of Kaffirs, and the burning of their huts, went on during 1834; and it was while the Patrols were thus occupied, that the important case of Goobie occurred, and which merits special attention. Goobie, a subject of Makomo, had ventured to lift up his assagai, in an attitude of defiance, and as if to prevent his hut being burnt, while a sick wife and child were within. For this offence he was seized, and laid across an ant-hill, and flogged with fifty lashes, imprisoned two months, and driven back to Kaffirland, for the offence of "resisting a sergeant in the execution of his duty." His lacerated back aroused his countrymen; quarrels ensued; an English ensign, of the name of Sparkes, was wounded in the arm by an assagai; ere long a native prince, Xoxo, was wounded, and the Kaffirs said, "*We had better die than be treated thus;*" and by the end of 1834, they invaded the colony, and the colonists suffered immense losses. Sir Benjamin D'Urban prepared to take vengeance. He established his head-quarters at Graham's Town, January, 1835. In May, 1835, Hintza, chief of

the Amakosa, was killed; and on the 10th of that month, the eastern boundary of the colony was declared to be the river Kei, and the country newly acquired was called "The Province of Queen Adelaide." This was subsequently disallowed by the Home Government, in which the Right Honourable Lord Glenelg was at that time the Colonial Secretary, and the country was restored to the Kaffirs, under the administration of Sir Andrew Stockenström. Several years' comparative repose followed; but in 1846, war again broke out, on which Sir Peregrine Maitland published his manifesto: the immediate occasion of which war was the murder, by some Kaffirs, of a Hottentot prisoner to whom a Kaffir prisoner was handcuffed, and who was being conducted into the colony for trial, on the charge of having stolen an axe at Fort Beaufort. The result of that war is known. Sir Harry Smith added the territory between the Kat River and Keiskama permanently to the colony under the name of Victoria, and assumed authority over all the country from the Keiskama to the Kei, under the name of British Kaffraria.

The whole of this sketch shows that the English have continually added to their territory by taking it from the Kaffirs. Each successive addition has been intended as a "punishment" of the natives. They are to be "chastised" for robberies or other injuries inflicted on the colony; they are then despoiled of land; they resent encroachment, and are again mulcted of more land. They try from time to time to regain what they have lost, and they suffer the more in each successive struggle; at the same time, the colony becomes increasingly exposed to these wars on the part of the Kaffirs, for the very punishments we inflict become new provocations, and the settlement of the question becomes more difficult and distant than ever.

It is not therefore any change of policy in detail, on the part of

the British Government towards the Kaffirs, that has led to these successive outbreaks. It is not the change in Sir Harry Smith's policy from that of his predecessors, that has led to the *present* outbreak—and which change has related principally to the formation of a Kaffir police, with various regulations adopted under the direction of a civil commissioner for Kaffir affairs, and subordinate commissioners for the respective tribes. The cause of the war lies in nothing of *this* kind. But it is neither more nor less than *their struggle for the recovery of territory*; in other words, for hereditary rights, for subsistence, and for life itself. Expel the Kaffirs from a portion of their own country, that it may be alienated from them, and annexed to the colony, and *where are they to go*? Upon the territories of neighbouring tribes? tribes probably at enmity with them, having old border feuds, and jealousies, and antipathies? This becomes simply impossible; and they are aware of it, and will not attempt it. Must they then try to find unoccupied land, clear forests, and subdue some new domain? Supposing this could be found, their families and cattle would for the most part perish in the meantime; besides which, the Kaffirs are mainly a pastoral people, and, till all their habits are changed in this respect, they will require, or think they require, large tracts of country, and will, of course, never consent to allow strangers to occupy their lands without molestation, struggles, and war to the knife.

That I have ground to affirm the present war does not originate in any mere change in the detail in the policy of Sir Harry Smith, or in any important difference between his and that of his predecessors in office, is evident, from the fact that these same struggles of the Kaffirs to regain their land have occurred under *all* systems; and for the reasons stated, obviously *must* occur under all systems. Changes in regulations affecting the "Spoor," or trace (foot-prints),

the recovery of stolen cattle, the trial of offences, the police and the patrol, however mounted, armed, or distributed, and whether native or foreign—these are minor circumstances, and may just serve, sooner or later, for pretexts or occasions of misunderstanding and outbreaks ; but the main question still is, *the occupation of land*. The Kaffirs think their territory is theirs. They will never relinquish their claim willingly ; and as long as we urge ours, we must stand prepared for incessantly repeated struggles, terminating in the total destruction of the Kaffir tribes, and the annexation of their country, and that of their neighbours, to our colony, all the way along the coast to the colony of Natal, and from thence again to the Portuguese settlement of Delagoa Bay. There is nothing to prevent this, but the adoption of some great system of equitable adjustment, and some comprehensive scheme by which the European, Colonial, and Native coloured races, the civilized and uncivilized, may come in contact, without fatal collision. And such system, I am persuaded, does not involve any moral or physical impossibility.

II.—WHO ARE TO DEFRAY THE HEAVY EXPENSES INCURRED BY THIS WAR ?

On the 7th March, the Premier, in his place in parliament, and in reply to some question from Sir De L. Evans, said that “ his noble friend (Earl Grey) at the head of the Colonial department, had written in the strongest manner, enjoining the Governor at the Cape to take care that no expenditure was incurred, in the event of any future Kaffir war, which would fall on this country, and that the colony must be expected to bear the expense of any such war.”

It is perfectly true that the colonists received an intimation of that nature from the colonial government at home. But then an

important question instantly arises in the mind of every intelligent man—Has the Imperial Government placed the colony in a position in which it could equitably demand that it *should* defend itself, and pay the expenses of war, that might arise there, from whatever cause they may happen to originate? It surely remains to be ascertained whether the Kaffir war, that has now broken out, is to be attributed to the faults of the colonists, or to some circumstances, right or wrong, connected with the Imperial Government. Do the Kaffirs throw the blame of their present position on the colonists? Have they uttered any complaints against the colonists? I believe that they have not, and that for a long time they have had no reason to do so. The fact is, they are exasperated against the government—the Imperial Government, as represented in the person of Sir Harry Smith. The Kaffirs do not make war on the colony, but on the Governor, for the measures he has dealt out to them. The present is in fact a movement with which the colonists have nothing to do, except as sufferers. The case stands thus:—Sir Harry Smith is sent out in 1847, not only as “Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Settlement of the Colony, &c.,” but also as “Her Majesty’s High Commissioner for the settling and adjustment of the affairs of the Territories in Southern Africa, adjacent and contiguous to the Eastern and North-Eastern Frontier of the said Colony, &c. &c.” Sir Harry Smith, in this capacity of “*Commissioner*,” and *not* as Governor of the Cape, arranges the business, and cuts off from the Kaffirs a large section of their country, which he constitutes and designates *British Kaffraria*.

Let it then be borne in mind that this British Kaffraria *is no part of the colony*, has never been annexed to it, and has its own officials, under the appointment of Sir Harry Smith, as High Commissioner; that in conducting its affairs Sir Harry Smith does

not act through the Colonial Secretary, but through his own secretary, as High Commissioner; and that the affairs of this "British Kaffraria" are as distinct from the affairs of the Cape Colony as those of some distinct settlement, or any other colony could be, such as Mauritius, Hong-Kong, or Ceylon. On no ground of equity, therefore, could the *colony* be held responsible for the expenses of the war. It is wholly an affair of the mother country, and much to the detriment of the colony. By the mother country, therefore, its expenses must be borne.

III. THE CAUSES OF DISAFFECTION OF SOME PARTIES WITHIN THE COLONY, AND OF DISCONTENT AMONG THE BORDER TRIBES.

I cannot see, from any evidence which has yet reached this country or been laid before the public, that there has been any *extensive* defection or alienation among the Hottentots. On the contrary, it appears that they have come forward loyally in defence of the colony, and to strengthen the hands of Government. The corps of Cape Mounted Rifles, one thousand strong, under the command of Major General Somerset, consists of Hottentots; and they constitute a brave, loyal, and most effective body of troops, who have ever rendered most efficient service on the eastern frontier and the Kaffir wars. In the official despatch of 30th Dec. 1850, they are praised "for their steady and gallant conduct." The only settlement of Hottentots on a large scale near the present seat of war, is at the Kat river, and with few exceptions the Hottentots there are yielding their services in aid of the colony. Other missionary institutions at which there are Hottentots, such as Hankey, Genadenthal, Grœnekloof, &c., are affording their quotas. That some effort has been required to rouse them to take part in this present war is perfectly true; that

they have not come forward so cheerfully and promptly as on some former occasions cannot be doubted, and that *some* are implicated in a charge of positive disloyalty is, I fear, a fact.

Can this state of things be accounted for? Have any measures been adopted towards these people which have had the effect of rendering them sullen, discontented, disloyal? There certainly have been such measures; and I advert to them, not as an apology for disloyalty, for which I offer *no* apology, but simply to assist in *accounting* for a perplexing and vexatious state of things. Looking at the many grievances of which they have complained, and others which they have borne without making complaint, and borne with exemplary endurance, till that virtue itself is well-nigh exhausted, I am not surprised at their present state of mind. All things considered, the position which they have assumed must be looked on with less severity than at the first moment we might be disposed to entertain. The Kat River people have had much to complain of under the vexatious administration of their late magistrate. I am aware he has been removed from office,—but *not till the mischief was done*. He ought never to have been appointed to that office, having neither sympathies with the people, nor a sufficient knowledge of the limitations of his power and authority as a magistrate to keep him from committing serious errors. Take, as an example, the following case. The people of Buxton, a village in the Kat River settlement, were, I must say, severely treated, for a slight trespass of cattle on some unenclosed corn fields; they were fined in the heavy penalty of £10 each, and having no money to pay, the cattle of three were taken and sold—thirty head of cattle to pay the £30!—and two other men were put in irons, imprisoned, and set to hard labour. I appealed to Sir Harry Smith on their behalf; the case was investigated, the magistrate severely censured,

ordered to refund the £30 (not thirty head of cattle), and to make some friendly arrangement with the men he had so cruelly imprisoned. Some subsequent acts of a like arbitrary character occurred, and he has been removed from office. But, *the mischief has been done*. A quiet, loyal, sober, and industrious people have been irritated, goaded, and maddened. Others of them, Gona Hottentots, have been turned out of their homes by magisterial orders, amidst much severity,—from which homes they could not have been legally expelled. They were improperly designated Kaffirs, Squatting Kaffirs, instead of Gona Hottentots. Their huts were burned—the last and direst insult that can be offered to a native. It is true, that on appealing to Sir Harry Smith, an investigation into this case was also made, and the people found some relief and justice; and they were allowed to return to their homes. But *the mischief had been done*, and they and their friends were exasperated and disgusted.

Many of these Hottentots, too, were sufferers after the last war. They were encouraged by Government proclamations to proceed against the common enemy under the promise of being allowed to keep for themselves the cattle they might capture. They seized cattle from the Kaffirs, which they brought home, finding, in all this, some little recompense for the toils of war and the risk of life. At the close of the war, colonists claimed those cattle as theirs, as having been previously stolen from them, and the people had to give them up without compensation,—a case in which, clearly, the colonist should have got his compensation from the Government, or the soldiers an adequate indemnification for the loss. The people felt, therefore, that the Government had not kept faith with them, and a sullen feeling of discontent has been engendered that cannot easily be allayed. These incitations to commandos and marauding expeditions are much to be

depreciated. They create and perpetuate an endless amount of irritation and wrong.

The case of *Hermanus* is a mournful one. I have nothing to say in vindication of his taking up arms against the colony. In his mad attack on Fort Hare he has perished, and received the reward of his temerity. But it must not be overlooked that he had been exasperated and that he had wrongs to complain of. In fact, this whole matter is a melancholy illustration of the calamitous results of a series of misdeeds, of original perfidy on his part and subsequently of oppression on ours. Hermanus was a Kaffir, and for a long period acted as interpreter, perhaps a spy, on behalf of the British Government. On peace being made with the Kaffirs after the war of 1834, it was impossible for Hermanus to return to his own country—he would have fallen a victim to the resentment of his countrymen. A piece of land was therefore allotted to him, and his family and followers—a piece, however, of which the Hottentots of the Kat River settlement were deprived,—a wrong done to them, in order to favour him. He continued on good terms with the colony until within a very recent period (1849), when Sir Harry Smith demanded of him quit-rent, of £1 each, for every head of a family among his people, amounting to from one hundred to one hundred and fifty—making, therefore, a claim of quit-rent from £100 to £150 per annum, and that, too, for a piece of land, that had been granted to him, free of all payments and for service done, and itself no larger than many single farms in the colony, and which do not pay more than about £7 per annum.

This was felt to be an arbitrary and unjust measure. Hermanus remonstrated, and was informed that His Excellency the Governor “cannot accede to his request, and that he and his people must either pay the quit-rent in question, or render themselves liable to

distrain;” that is, they should be deprived of their cattle—their only property; to them, the loss of their all. Further appeals were made to the Governor, and I apprehend the distraint has *not* really been made. Within a few months the war has broken out. But whether the distraint was actually made or not, the *irritation* was the same. Hermanus and his people would feel goaded to extremities, and the consequence has been their mad attempt of attacking the Fort, as already stated. His people and their families are scattered to the winds, and their lands forfeited for ever. Of course many of the people will perish, and the estate will be sold.

I observe also, in some of the papers, a report that Moshesh, Chief of the Bassutos, had expressed some hostile intentions towards the colony, and had actually proceeded to invest Bloem Fontein. I indulge a hope that this will prove to be an unfounded, or exaggerated report. I saw much of this chieftain during my late visit to South Africa, and I cannot help entertaining the most unwavering conviction that, at that time, it was *his most anxious desire to preserve a good understanding with the Government*. It is true, he was deeply hurt with the unjust and ungenerous measures adopted towards him, of despoiling him of a large, well-occupied, and most valuable portion of his territory, and forcing him by intimidation to sign a treaty that makes it over to the British, although neither he nor any other chieftain in South Africa has any right or power to transfer the lands of their subjects; and all this, too, while Moshesh had given us no offence, but had proved himself a faithful ally, as Sir Harry Smith has himself assured the British Government, in various despatches, and which have been printed by order of the House of Commons.

And I must add that, even though Moshesh himself might be

most anxious to remain our steady ally and friend, notwithstanding the unjust treatment he had received, he might possibly find it beyond his power to restrain his people. It must, I venture to think, have been in some moment of soreness and exasperation, while smarting under their wrongs, that they have made this attack on Bloem Fontein, *if it be true* that they really have done so.

And here I cannot refrain from saying that *all* the border tribes are in a state of comparative discontent and alienation, and that, too, against their own deliberate wishes and judgment. They are most anxious for peace and friendship. They are ready to meet our fair demands on all occasions; to part with portions of their territory for our convenience, on adequate compensation; and to observe with all fidelity the treaties we make with them. I affirm this on my personal knowledge of them, and their own deliberate and reiterated assurances. But I have nevertheless seen that, with all their wishes for peace and friendship, and all their own deepest conviction that their very existence depends on their friendship with us, they were suffering extreme vexation and disgust, and repressed resentment. They looked to Sir H. Smith in vain for relief from his oppressive measures, and on this ground they intreated and charged me to lift up a voice on their behalf, as on behalf of an oppressed people, too impotent to defend themselves. I failed not to bring these matters under your Lordship's attention as early as I could, and I hesitated not to intimate then, that I was sure it was essential to the peace and welfare of the colony that the border tribes should be in a state of friendship with us, and not of restless dissatisfaction and sullen enmity. What I feared as a result has now overtaken us, and more rapidly and terribly than I had supposed. Already the scene is characterised by a fearful

amount of violence, cruelty, devastation, and bloodshed. A fire is kindled that may be smothered, but, I suspect, cannot soon be extinguished. Much valuable blood has already flown, *not one drop of which need to have been shed*, if we had acted with promptness in listening to the cry of men that felt they were wronged, and yet wished to be friends. A wise, prudent, calm, and conciliatory government, *would* have listened to all this. The Governor said he wished to conciliate, but *he did not conciliate*; he said he had subdued men, but they were not subdued; he ruled on the prestige of his fame, and men became desperate. He was asked to review some measures that gave offence, and he said they were *final*! True, the natives might have remained sullen and discontented; and better, some would say, to have borne their wrongs, than attempt to resent them as they have done; but they have taken the cause into their own hands; probably they will perish in the attempt; but they foresaw this, and yet they have preferred the sad alternative, and will perish, assagai in hand.

It deserves to be noticed also, in reference to a disinclination said to exist within the colony itself, towards rendering the aid the Governor had called for to repel this outbreak on the part of the Kaffirs, that it has not been confined to the coloured tribes, Hottentots, or others. Many of the burghers, who, it was confidently anticipated, would instantly enrol themselves for service, had not done so, and stronger appeals were accordingly made to induce them to act, under the fearful intimation that, unless they did so without delay, the whole colony was in imminent danger—that the Kaffirs might gain an advantage by their overwhelming numbers over the forts, and then easily carry the war with all its attendant horrors into the very heart of the colony. Many circumstances might be stated to account for this lingering irreso-

lution on the part of the burghers; they would be naturally unwilling to leave their families and homes comparatively undefended, and they would be anxious to remain and gather in the harvest wherever it was ready. Possibly, too, they were disposed to think that the numbers of the Kaffir enemy were exaggerated, and that the forces at the disposal of the Governor would prove sufficient to meet the danger. And I confess I suspect there has been some exaggeration in nearly all the accounts hitherto published. It is questionable whether the Kaffirs have really appeared in such immense hordes, so many thousands of warriors, as we find stated. Nor can I easily think that Hermanus had *four hundred* of his people in his attack on Fort Hare. I do not believe he had more than half that number capable of bearing arms. The rest of this large number must have consisted of *other* Kaffirs, who had come in and taken advantage of the unsettled state of affairs, and joined themselves to his standard just for the occasion.

A more serious cause of this present sullen and alienated state of feeling through the colony, lies in that utter want of sympathy between the Government and the colonists which has been silently augmenting for a long time past, and which threatens the most serious consequences, even though no border war were existing. The colonists, my Lord, feel themselves aggrieved and trifled with. I advert to the convict question only, *en passant*, and offer no remark on it, but to say that it has left a soreness and suspiciousness that cannot easily be effaced. The colonists have asked for self-government, and I am aware it is promised, with liberal measures; but they also feel that they do not get it. The wishes of the great majority of the colonists are not responded to; and men feel mortified, morose, and almost reckless of consequences. And besides all this, the members of Government are all

appointments from home. *No colonist is admitted to power and influence*, and this creates a sense of degradation; it treats them as though they were neither honest nor competent men, while they are conscious they are both. This state of apathy and disaffection is one of the worst signs in the whole case under review, and can only be relieved by some noble, just, and generous measures on the part of the British Government.

And here I might ask, not merely on whose head the heavy load of responsibility for all this calamity rests, but *where* is the mischief to end? Suppose Sir Harry Smith succeeds, as he no doubt will, in putting down this outbreak for the time, crushing the Gaikas, expelling them from the Amatola range of mountains, and constituting some new boundary for the colony; what possible security does this afford against another outbreak in the course of a few more years? To me it appears even to necessitate a new effort on the part of the Kaffirs to regain their lost territory. They will have more forfeited territory to sigh for; there will be more families suffering loss, more indignant warriors breathing retaliation, and only waiting their opportunity. Besides, by driving large bodies of men into a narrow space, their means of subsistence are diminished, and their temptations to reprisals multiplied as by necessity. And then there must be a woeful intermingling of the disaffected with the well affected. Drive out the Gaikas from the Amatola, and throw them among the people of Pato and Kreili, friendly chiefs—the latter become disheartened by the multitudes thrown in upon them, to occupy their lands and devour their herds; and, however friendly and faithful in “sitting still” these people may be, let us not deceive ourselves in imagining that their sympathies will continue to go with us, rather than with their own countrymen, although countrymen of other tribes. They will strengthen each other's hands.

The tale of wrongs and sufferings will be repeated with dreadful energy, and awaken in every young Kaffir warrior the fire of revenge, and the determination to scourge the colony again as soon as he can.

It may be purely a military question as to the best boundary lines—the best natural line of defence. I have little faith in any of these lines, and I pretend not to form a judgment on their comparative value. I much question if any range of mountains, any gorge, or any stream, can form much defence against a rude and daring people like the Kaffirs. Whenever they *think* they are strong enough they will measure their strength with ours. *They* will be beaten, but *we* shall suffer even in victory, and have a long and heavy bill of reckoning to pay.

IV.—BY WHAT MEANS CAN A RECURRENCE OF THESE CALAMITIES BE SUPERSEDED ?

This is, I apprehend, the gravest question of all. I presume merely to suggest a few considerations: I offer them, however, not as the result of a momentary impulse, but of frequent and earnest attention to the subject. I am convinced that, *first of all*, there is required,—*An immediate, impartial, and comprehensive inquiry on the spot*—an inquiry into all the measures of the Government which have affected the border tribes during the past fifteen or eighteen years, that is to say, from the date of Lord Glenelg's despatches at the close of the war of 1834. Such inquiry ought to be made on the spot, and conducted in open court; it ought to be most unflinching and minute; it should be an inquiry in which the natives themselves, chiefs, captains, and people would be called on to speak, and where they would be heard with patience, however tedious they might seem,

however circuitous their mode of stating their case, or however irrelevant some of the matter might seem to be, which they would, in all probability, introduce. Nothing short of this can satisfy them, and I think that nothing short of this can meet the equitable demands of the case. They consider themselves wronged, they feel aggrieved, they think we are the aggressors; then let them be heard in their own case, and let them assuredly adopt their own mode of stating the case. And I should say, let *all* be examined and heard who can give information on these matters, embracing the officers of government, civil, military, and judicial, merchants, traders, travellers, farmers, and missionaries. Let this inquiry be conducted by men unconnected with the colony; possibly some of the civil servants of India might be, from their habits, intelligence, and high position, eminently qualified for such a service, only taking care that they are endowed with the qualities of patience, penetration, and impartiality. The obvious tendency of such an investigation would be to elicit a valuable mass of information, from which certain great principles and illustrations of principles might be safely gathered. The utility of such a mass of evidence can neither be questioned nor overrated. The sources of many past evils would be developed, and that would go far to suggest the method of avoiding them for the future. Something is gained in pursuit of the right road, when we know which roads are certainly wrong. Such an inquiry might involve considerable expense; but any expense is economy compared with the drain of a periodically-recurring Kaffir war. It might be attended with many difficulties, and involve many awkward consequences, but all that is ease itself compared with the sadly augmenting evils of border wars, and the prospect of such border wars becoming every year more formidable, and more difficult of ultimate adjustment.

Second. *Parliamentary inquiry.*

The investigation which I have just recommended refers to local inquiry in the colony, and in the locality of the border tribes themselves, so as to give them every facility of saying all they have to say, which could not be effected if the inquiry were conducted here in this country. It is obvious that natives, the parties so deeply concerned, could not and would not attend a Committee of the House of Commons. To do them justice, the inquiry must then be *in loco*; but it need not terminate there. Nothing will fully meet the case but a further inquiry in this country, similar to that conducted by the Committee on the State of our Aborigines in 1834. This alone will bring the matter fully under the notice of the Parliament, and lead to such measures and recommendations as, being adopted and carried out by Her Majesty's Government, will meet the exigencies of the case. This Committee should be supplied with all the facts and evidences sent home by the commission of inquiry; and it would examine all parties within its reach in this country.

Third. *Giving to the colonists a liberal constitution for their own self-government, and that without delay.*

This measure need not be delayed for the result of the proposed inquiries, and it ought not, I apprehend, to be delayed for an hour. The sooner the affairs of the Cape are placed in good faith in the hands of the colonists themselves, the sooner will peace and tranquillity prevail, for all the energy and intelligence of the colonists will then become available for these objects, and never till then. They will incur a responsibility they do not feel at present; they will willingly incur it, and they will sedulously discharge it. The inquiry need not, I have said, delay the granting a constitution to the colonists, and for this plain reason, that as our relations with the border tribes have been determined by

the Imperial Government ever since we had a colony there, so must they for some time continue to be so determined. The Imperial Government, and not the colony, has fixed the boundaries from time to time, and conducted all the business of our relations with the border tribes. This could not all at once be transferred to the Colonial Legislature. It relates not to *internal administration*, to which I presume the powers of the local government will yet for a long time be limited. It relates to what may be termed the foreign policy. The Imperial Government may avail itself of all the aid the local government can render in these matters, and that will be much, from its intimacy with them and deep interest in them. But the real power of acting must be with the parent country, until all the colonial affairs are so thoroughly consolidated, that the colony itself may undertake all affairs that relate to it of this nature. At the same time I apprehend that so long as a colony remains a colony and does not become an independent state, its foreign relations must not only be supervised, but managed, directed, and controlled by the Imperial Legislature—I do not say the Imperial Government, for that might just perpetuate all the evils of a system that has hitherto worked so injuriously—but the Imperial Legislature, where every great measure might undergo full investigation and fair discussion. But supposing a constitution to exist, it would operate on a large scale to prevent the evils of which there is now so much room to complain. There would be at once a strong counteractive force to the circumstances likely to create war. The colony, finding its interests to be identified with peace, would vigilantly guard against measures that would endanger it—would be on the alert to check the first step likely to introduce collision—would have its agents ready to hear the first whisperings of danger—and would court cautious investigation of grievances,

before committing itself to any warlike measures. And it would do all this the more vigorously after it might have taken on itself the responsibility of paying the greater part, if not the whole, of the military establishment. The very danger of being saddled in any way with a debt created by a war, would make it lynx-eyed to detect, expose, and eradicate the latent sources of danger.

In regard to the Legislative Assembly, which is to consist of representatives chosen by the people, it is scarcely necessary to advert here to the question of the Franchise, inasmuch as that affects the condition of the Kaffirs only indirectly and somewhat remotely. But my impression is that, the lower the money qualification for the franchise, the better for the colony, *even* in relation to its connexion with the Kaffirs, and other Border tribes, just because, the wider the basis of the power to exercise the right of election, the larger the number of the coloured population that will have a vote; and then, most certainly the greater the confidence cherished by the coloured tribes towards the House of Assembly, and the greater the probability of their being satisfied with its measures.

Fourth. *The appointment of a Civilian as Governor, instead of a Military Officer.*

So long as there are in the colony troops, there must no doubt be a commander of the forces; but so long as there are great civil and commercial interests at stake, and which the military are only there to protect, so long should there be a Governor whose sympathies and talents lie mainly in this latter direction. The colony does not exist for the military, but the military for the colony. They are its defenders and police; but it is not fitting that the head of the police should be at the head of all affairs, as though a colony were nothing more than a great police establishment. There are noble exceptions to the rule, but for the most part military men know but one idea well, and that is, to rule men by

